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HUMAN DIGNITY,
HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND POLITICAL
REGIMES
RHODA E. HOWARD
McMasterUniversity
JACK DONNELLY
Universityof North Carolina
ChapelHill

It is often argued that internationallyrecognizedhuman rights
are commonto all culturaltraditionsand adaptableto a greatvarietyof social structures
and political regimes. Such argumentsconfuse human rights with human dignity. All
societies possess conceptions of human dignity, but the conception of human dignity
underlyinginternationalhuman rightsstandardsrequiresa particulartype of "liberal"
regime.Thisconclusionis reachedthrougha comparisonof the social structuresof ideal
type liberal, minimal, traditional,communist, corporatistand developmentalregimes
and their impact on autonomy, equality, privacy, social conflict, and the definitionof
societal membership.
T he international
human rights elaboratedin the Universal
Declarationof HumanRightsand the International Human Rights Covenants
often are held to be compatible with a
great variety of political regimes.For example, Khushalani(1983, p. 404) argues
that "the concept of human rights can be
traced to the origin of the human race
itself," and that "all the philosophies of
our time"are committedto humanrights.
Likewise, Graefrath (1983, p. 6) argues
that internationalhumanrightsstandards
"canbe adaptedto any legal system"(cf.
Buultjens,1980;Gros Espiell,1979;Marasinghe, 1984; Mojekwu, 1980; Pollis,
1982; Ruffin, 1982; Stackhouse, 1984;
Wiarda, 1982). We argue, however, that
internationalhuman rights standardsare

based on a distinctivesubstantiveconception of humandignity. They thereforerequirea particulartype of "liberal"regime,
which may be institutionalizedin various
forms, but only within a relatively narrow rangeof variation.The authorscited
above confuse human rights with human
dignity.
"Human dignity" figures prominently
in internationalhumanrightsdocuments;
for example, the International Human
Rights Covenants proclaim that human
rights"derivefrom the inherentdignityof
the human person"(1966). Furthermore,
every form of political regime implicitly
reflects a particularsocial conception of
human dignity. Nonetheless, human
rights and human dignity are quite
distinctnotions.
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Conceptionsof humandignity, in their
social and political aspects, express particular understandings of the inner
(moral) nature and worth of the human
person and his or her proper (political)
relationswith society. Human rights, by
contrast, are the equal and inalienable
rights, in the strong sense of entitlements
that ground particularlypowerful claims
against the state, that each person has
simply as a human being. Human rights
are a particularsocial practice that aims
to realizea distinctivesubstantiveconception of humandignity (Donnelly, 1982a).
Conceptionsof human dignity vary dramatically across societies, and most of
thesevariationsare incompatiblewith the
values of equality and autonomy that
underlie human rights. Most regimesand theirunderlyingsocial conceptionsof
human dignity-necessarily deny both
the idea and the practiceof humanrights.
In order to examine the relations between human rights and conceptions of
human dignity across a wide range of
regimes,our analysisreliesheavily on the
use of ideal types-"the constructionof
certainelementsof realityinto a logically
precise conception" (Weber, 1946, p.
59)-especially ideal-typeconceptionsof
the human person and his or her obligations to and claims upon society and the
state. We first specify the philosophical
and structural connections between the
"liberal"conceptionof humandignityand
the principle and practice of human
rights. Then we show how four major
contemporary regime types, which we
call communitarian,necessarilyrepudiate
human rights because of their commitment to alternativesocial conceptionsof
human dignity.
The particularinterpretationof liberalism we adopt provides the philosophical
and structural basis for international
human rights norms. This is not a paper
on liberal theory. In another context we
would arguefor the authenticityof our interpretation,but here we claim only that
802

it is a plausible, standardreading of the
liberaltradition.Our subjectin this article
is human rights, not liberalism. Therefore, even if our definitionshould prove
to be stipulative, the substance of our
argument,whichfocuseson the social and
political requirementsof human rights,
would remainlargely unaffected.
We shouldalso note that we do not join
argumentsabout the content of lists of
human rights. Instead, as is common in
the humanrightsliterature,we acceptthe
list in the Universal Declaration of
HumanRightswithout argument.In particular,we avoid rehashingold arguments
about economicand social rights.Bothon
theoreticalgrounds(see Donnelly, 1982b;
Donnelly, 1985, ch. 6; Shue, 1980, pt. 1).
and in light of the nearlyuniversalofficial
acceptanceof the UniversalDeclaration,
we adopt the full list of rightsit provides,
with civil, political, economic, and social
rights on an equal footing.
While these two simplifying assumptions narrowour focus, our argumentremains significant and controversial.We
contend that internationallyrecognized
human rights require a liberal regime.
Other types of regimes, and the conceptions of human dignity on which they
rest, may be defensibleon other moral or
political grounds,but they will not stand
up to scrutiny under the standard of
humanrights.

and HumanRights:
Liberalism
A NecessaryConnection
Liberalism,Equality,
and PersonalAutonomy
We follow RonaldDworkin (1977, ch.
12; 1985, ch. 8) in arguingthat the heart
of liberalismis expressedin the basic political right to equal concernand respect:
Governmentmust treat those whom it governs
with concern,that is, as humanbeingswho are
capable of sufferingand frustration,and with
respect,thatis, as humanbeingswho arecapable
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of formingand actingon intelligentconceptions
of how theirlives should be lived. Government
must not only treat people with concern and
respect, but with equal concernand respect.It
must not distributegoods or opportunitiesunequallyon the groundthat some citizensare entitled to more becausethey are worthy of more
concern. It must not constrainliberty on the
groundthat one citizen'sconceptionof the good
life .

.

. is nobler or superior to another's.

(Dworkin,1977, p. 273)

The state must treat each person as a
moral and political equal-not assure
each an equal share of social resources,
but treat all with equal concern and
respect. Inequalitiesin goods or opportunities that arise directly or indirectly
from political decisions-and many such
inequalitiesare easily justified within a
liberal regime-must be compatiblewith
the right to equal concernand respect.
Personal liberty, especially the liberty
to choose and lead one's own life, clearly
is entailed by the principle of equal
respect:for the state to interferein mattersof personalmoralitywould be to treat
the life plans and values of some as
superiorto others. A certain amount of
economicliberty is also required,at least
to the extent that decisions concerning
consumption,investment,and risk reflect
free decisions based on personal values
thatarisefromautonomouslychosenconceptions of the good life. Libertyalone,
however, cannot serve as the overriding
value of social life, as the end to be maximized by political association.
Libertyreadily degeneratesinto license
and social atomizationunless checkedby
a fairly expansive,positive conceptionof
the personsin relationto whom it is exercised. If libertyis to fosterdignity,it must
be exercisedwithin the constraintsof the
principleof equal concernand respect.In
fact, autonomy and equality are less a
pair of guiding principles than different
manifestationsof the centralliberalcommitmentto the equalworth and dignityof
each and every person.
Each human being is of equal moral
worth individually,whatever his or her
803

social utility. Individuals-regardless of
who they are or where they stand-have
an inherentdignity and moral worth that
the state must not merely passively
respect, but for which it must demonstrate an active concern. Furthermore,
everyone is entitledto this equal concern
and respect.Minimumstandardsof political treatmentare embodied in (human)
rights;they are not merelydesirablegoals
of social policy. This implies a particular
conception of the relation of the individual to the communityand the state.
Man is a social animal; human potential, and even personalindividuality,can
be developed and expressed only in a
social context. Society requires the
discharge of certain political functions,
and large-scalepolitical organizationrequires the state. However, the state-especially the modern state-also presents
particularlyseriousthreatsto humandignity. The state is easily turned to the
denial of equal concern and respect,
through the enforcementof a particular
vision of the good life or the entrenchment of privilegedinequality.Therefore,
human rights have a special referenceto
the state, in orderto keep it an instrument
to realize, rather than undermine,equal
concernand respect.In the inevitableconflictsbetweenthe individualand the state,
the liberal gives prima facie priority, in
the areas protectedby human rights, to
the individual.
For the liberal, the individual is not
merely separable from the community
and social roles, but specially valued
precisely as a distinctive, discrete individual-which is why each personmust
be treatedwith equalconcernand respect.
The state and society are conceived, in
more or less contractarianterms,as forms
of association for the fuller unfolding of
humanpotential,throughthe exerciseand
enjoymentof human rights. Human dignity, for the liberal, is largely encompassedin the vision of life as an equaland
autonomousmemberof society, enjoying
a full range of human rights.
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This liberal view of man is rooted in
structuralchangesthatbegan to emergein
late medieval and early modern Europe,
gained particularforce in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, and today are
increasingly the norm throughout the
world. The "creation"of the private individual separate from society is closely
linked to the rise of a new, more complex
division of labor, the resultingchangesin
class structure(particularlythe rise and
then dominanceof the bourgeoisie),and a
new vision of the individual'srelationship
to God, society, and the state.
These developments are well known,
and need not be recountedhere. For our
purposes,though, it is importantto stress
that in the social changes of modernization-especially migration,urbanization,
and technological development-the allencompassingmoral whole of traditional
or feudal society was replacedby a much
more segmented social order. In particular, politics was separated from
religion, the economy, and law, which
were likewise separated from one
another. Individuals,too, were separated
from society as a whole; no longer could
personsbe reducedto theirroles, to parts
of the community. With separate individuals, possessing special worth and
dignity preciselyas individuals,the basis
for human rights was established.
Occurringparallel to these changes in
society was the equally well-known
development of the modern state. The
new bourgeois class was initially a principal backer of the newly rising princes
and kings and theirstates;both sharedan
interest in freeing themselves from the
constraints of the old feudal order.
However, as the modern state's power
grew, it increasingly threatened the individual citizen. Bourgeois "freemen"
began to demand, therefore,that they indeed be free. Such demands eventually
took the form of arguments for the
universalnaturalrightsand equalityof all
men. In the new socially mobile society,
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in which entrance to and exit from the
bourgeois class was relatively unpredictable, a new set of privileges could not
readilybe reservedfor a new elite defined
by birth or some similar characteristic.
Rather, in order that some (the bourgeoisie) might be able to exercise these
new rights, they had to be guaranteedfor
all.
Thus, human rights came to be articulatedprimarilyas claimsof any individual
against the state. Humanrightslay down
the basic form of the relationship between the (new, modern) individual and
the (new, modern) state, a relationship
based on the primafacie priorityof the individualover the state in those areasprotectedby humanrights. Humanrightsare
viewed as (morally) prior to and above
society and the state, and under the control of individuals, who hold them and
may exercisethem against the state in extreme cases. This reflects not only the
equality of all individuals,but also their
autonomy-their right to have and pursue interests and goals different from
those of the state or its rulers.In the areas
and endeavors protected by human
rights, the individualis "king,"or rather,
an equal and autonomousperson entitled
to equal concernand respect.
In practice,of course, these values and
structural changes remain incompletely
realizedeven today, and for most of the
modernera they have been restrictedto a
small segment of the population. Nonetheless, the ideal was establishedand its
implementationbegun. Even if the demand for human rights began as a tactic
of the bourgeoisieto protectits own class
interests, the logic of universal, inalienable personalrightshas long since broken
free of these origins.
Furthermore,while these processes of
sociopolitical individuation and state
buildingwere first played out in Europe,
they are increasinglythe rule throughout
the world. As a result, the structuralbasis
for a society of equal and autonomousin-
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dividuals is being universalized. Social
structuretoday increasinglyparallelsthe
near universal diffusion of the idea of
humanrightsand the philosophicalclaim
that human rights are universal. Individualhumanrights, therefore,increasingly appearnot merely as moral ideals,
but as both objectively and subjectively
necessary to protect and realize human
dignity (cf. Howard, 1986).
Liberalismand International
HumanRights
The standardlist of humanrightsin the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
can be easily derivedfrom the liberalconception of the individual and the state.
Otherlists, of course, have been and may
be derived from these principles,but we
would argue that the near perfect fit between liberalism and the Universal
Declarationreflects a deep and essential
theoreticalconnection.
To be treatedwith concernand respect,
whetherequal or unequal, requiresprior
recognitionof the individualas a moral
and legal person, which in turn requires
certain basic personal rights. Rights to
recognitionbefore the law and to nationality (UniversalDeclaration, Articles 6,
15) are prerequisitesto politicaltreatment
as a person. In a somewhatdifferentvein,
the rightto life, as well as rightsto protection againstslavery, torture,and otherinhumanor degradingtreatment(Articles3,
4, 5) are essential to recognition and
respectas a person.
Rightssuch as freedomsof speech,conscience,religion,and association(Articles
18, 19) protecta sphereof personalautonomy. The right to privacy (Article 12)
even moreexplicitlyaims to guaranteethe
capacity to realize personal visions of a
life worthy of a human being. Personal
autonomy also requires economic and
social rights, such as the right to education (Article26), which provides the intellectualresourcesfor informedautonomous choices and the skills needed to act
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on them, and the right to participatein
the culturallife of the community(Article
27), which recognizes the social and
culturaldimensionsof personal development. In its political dimension, equal
respectalso impliesdemocraticcontrol of
the state, and thus rights to vote and to
freedoms of (political) speech, press,
assembly, and association (Articles 19,
20, 21).
The principle of equal concern and
respect also requires the government to
intervene to reduce social and economic
inequalities that deny equal personal
worth. The state must actively intervene
to protectthosewho, as a resultof natural
or voluntarymembershipin an unpopular
group, are subject to social, political, or
economic discriminationthat limits their
accessto a fair shareof social resourcesor
opportunities.Rights such as equal protection of the laws and protectionagainst
discriminationon such bases as race, color, sex, language, religion, opinion,
origin, property,birth, or status (Articles
2, 7) are essentialto assurethat all people
are treatedas fully and equally human.
In the economic sphere, the traditional
liberalattachmentto the marketis not accidental:quite aside from its economicefficiency, the market places minimal
restraintson economic liberty, and thus
maximizespersonalautonomy. However,
marketdistributionof resourcescan have
grossly unequaloutcomes. Inequalityper
se is not objectionableto the liberal, but
the principleof equal concernand respect
does imply a floor of basic economic
welfare; degrading inequalities (Shue,
1980, pp. 119-23) cannot be permitted.
The state also has an appropriateinterest
in redressingmarket-generatedinequalities because a "free market" system of
distributingresourcesis actively backed
by the state, which protectsand enforces
propertyrights.
Differential market rewards are not
neutral; they reward morally equal individualsunequally.Marketdistributions
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may be substantially affected by such
morally irrelevant factors as race, sex,
class, or religion, while many of the
"talents"richly rewardedby the market
are of dubious moral significance. Even
"achieved" inequalities, should they
threaten the (moral) equality or autonomy of other citizens, present at least a
prima facie case for state intervention.
The principleof equalconcernand respect
requires the state to act positively to
cancelunjustifiablemarketinequalities,at
least to the point that all are assured a
minimumshare of resourcesthrough the
implementationof social and economic
rights. In human rights terms, this implies, for example, rights to food, health
care, and social insurance (Articles 22,
25).
Effortsto alleviate degradingor disrespectfulmiseryand deprivationdo not exhaust the scope of the economicdemands
of the principle of equal concern and
respect. The right to work (Article 23),
which is essentially a right to economic
participation,is of especiallygreatimportance. It has considerableintrinsicvalue:
work is essential to a life of dignity, insofar as man is conceivedas homo faber.
It also has great instrumentalvalue, both
for the satisfactionof basicmaterialneeds
and for providing a secure and dignified
economic foundationfrom which to pursue personal values and objectives. A
(limited)rightto property(Article17) can
be justifiedin similarterms.
Finally, the special threat to personal
autonomy and equality presentedby the
modernstate requiresa set of legal rights
such as the presumptionof innocenceand
rightsto due process,fair and publichearings before an independenttribunal,and
protection from arbitraryarrest, detention, or exile (Articles 8-11). More
broadly, the special threat to dignity
posed by the state is reflectedin the fact
that all humanrightsare held particularly
against the state. Moreover, they hold
against all types of states, democraticas
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much as any other: if one's government
treatsone as less than fully human,it matters little, if at all, how that government
came to power. The individualof course
has social duties (Article 29), but the
discharge of social obligations is not a
precondition for having or exercising
human rights.
We have thus moved from the liberal
principleof equal concern and respectto
the full list of humanrightsin the Universal Declaration. These rights, in turn,
demand-and if implementedwould play
a crucial role in creating-a liberal society, and the ideal person envisioned by
liberalism(cf. Donnelly, 1985, ch. 3). It
would be equally simple to work back
from the Universal Declaration to the
principleof equal concernand respect.In
fact, the association between liberalism
and human rights runs so deep that the
realization of human rights is the principal liberal standardfor evaluating the
achievements,and even the legitimacy,of
any regime (cf. Donnelly, 1985, pp.
69-73).
Liberalismvs. the MinimalState
In practice,obviously, even the best of
actual liberal regimes fall short of the
ideal we have been discussing, and the
human rights records of many selfprofessed liberal societies merit severe
criticism. Furthermore, many avowed
liberals view liberty and equality as
largely antagonistic principles to be
traded off against one another, rather
than as complementarydimensionsof the
single principle of equal concern and
respect. One way to make this tradeoffis
to choose liberty and disregardequality,
establishinga "minimal"or "nightwatchman"regime.
Advocates of the minimal state (e.g.,
Nozick, 1974) would largely limit the
state to protecting public order and
private property. To assure the good
behavior of the nightwatchman,"nega-
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tive" civil and political rights are also required,especiallycivil liberties,narrowly
conceived as rights to public noninterferencein the private lives (very broadly
understood)of individuals.Yet minimalism also explicitlyprotectspropertyrights
while rejecting economic and social
human rights. Beyond minimalism'sobvious incompatibilitywith international
human rights standards(which minimalists readily allow), its deep commitment
to protectingprivatepropertywhile denying all other economic and social rights
borders on logical contradiction;we can
see no way that precisely and only this
one economic right can justifiably be
allowed on the minimalist'slist of human
rights.
The standard rights-based (i.e., not
merelyutilitarian)argumentsfor the right
to private property in such contexts rest
on the importanceof guaranteedprivate
economic activity,and resourcesfor the
enjoyment of personal autonomy.
Clearly,however, such an argumentdoes
not justify a right to unlimitedindividual
accumulation:at a certain point, additional economic resources contribute
nothing at all to personalautonomy, and
long beforethat point the marginalreturn
becomes vanishingly small. Even more
importantly, exactly the same argument
can be made for other social and
economic rights. In fact, a substantially
stronger case can be made for rights to
work, a minimumstandardof living, and
health care.
In any case, the minimalstate is almost
certain to be self-destructingif it recognizes equal, universal civil and political
rights. The denial of political participation usually rests on a desire to protect
social and economicprivilege,while those
previouslyexcludedfrom politicalparticipation tend to use their newly acquired
power to obtain a fair, or at least a
tolerable, share of social resources (cf.
Goldstein, 1983). The emergenceof the
Western welfare state and popular
pressurethroughoutthe Third World for
807

social services clearly suggests that implementing equal, universal political
rights will transforma minimalregime.
The only way to avoid this would be to
entrench a right to private property
against the exercise of all other human
rights. This is obviously unjustifiable;no
plausible theory of human nature or
dignityyields this one right as superiorto
all other human rights. However, lesser
entrenchment, allowing redistribution
beyond a certain level of accumulation,
would be ineffective. If the point beyond
which redistribution would take place
were set democratically,a minimalregime
would almost certainlybe democratically
abolished, or at least dismantled over
time. Any other way of setting the limit,
however, would deny the equality of
political rights.
In otherwords, the minimalstate, in its
very essence, is a violator of human
rights, even within the limits of its own
terms of reference.Liberalism'sdual pursuit of autonomy and equalityis replaced
in minimalismby a single-mindedpursuit
of autonomy understood largely as the
social guaranteeof the broadest possible
sphere of private action, virtually irrespectiveof its social consequences.Forthe
minimalist, human dignity is expressed
principallyin the unequal, achieved consequences of private, largely conflictual,
action.
The minimal state thus is not the pure
form of liberalismit is often represented
to be by both minimalistsand variousleftist critics of liberalism. Rather, it is a
perverse and internally inconsistentnarrowing of liberalismthat is also inconsistent with internationalhumanrightsstandards.

Equality,Autonomy and
CommunitarianSocieties
Having shown that human rights and
liberal regimesare closely matched, it re-
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mains to be shown that other types of
regimes are incompatible with the
demandsof human rights, a task that we
have begun with the discussionabove of
the minimal state. In this section we examinefour majortypes of communitarian
society, which together encompass the
vast majorityof contemporarynonliberal
regimes.
We define communitariansocieties as
those that give ideological and practical
priority to the community (sometimes
embodied in the state) over the individual. Such societies regard their
members as worthy of concern and
respect, but only as membersof society
performingprescribedroles. Their concepts of humandignity, therefore,are not
rooted in the notion of human rights.
Communitariansocieties are antithetical
to the implementationand maintenance
of human rights, because they deny the
autonomy of the individual, the irreduciblemoral equality of all individuals,
and the possibilityof conflictbetweenthe
community'sinterestsand the legitimate
interestsof any individual.
TraditionalSocieties
Traditional societies are communal,
status-basedsocieties, governed according to principlesand practicesheld to be
fixed by tradition. They are usually ethnically homogeneous and agricultural,
and frequently stateless. In traditional
society, one'sworth, rights,and responsibilities arise from and remaintied to differentialmembershipin a particularsociety, with unequal,status-basedprivileges
and duties resting on age, sex, caste, or
other ascriptivehierarchies.The idea that
one is entitled to equal concern and
respect and a wide range of inalienable
personal rights simply because one is a
human being is utterly foreign to traditionalsocieties.Only certainkindsof people are defined as moral persons, that is,
human beings.
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Although most people in traditional
societies have at least some rights and
privileges, these are contingent on the
proper fulfillment of social roles, rather
than basic personal rights held against
society. Evenwithin the recognizedsocial
boundaries,some people may be defined
as outsiders, as nonbelieversare defined
in strict Islamic societies, or ethnic
strangersin traditionalAfrica. The relationship between the individual(if he or
she may be so called) and society is by
definition nonconflictual;everyone's interests are incorporatedinto the higher
value system representedby the politicalreligious-legaldecision makers.Man and
society are assumed to be inseparable.
The very idea of inalienable individual
rightsheld equallyby all againstthe community is, if comprehensible,likely to be
viewed with horror (cf. Legesse,1980, p.
124).
In traditionalsocieties, there is no notion of the autonomousindividual.One's
worth, even one's existence,is definedby
one's place, one's role in the community;
apart from the community, one does not
exist, or at least such an existence is
largely without moral value. One's dignity-which usually is conceived primarily as an attribute of one's kinship,
age, sex, or occupational group-is obtained or validated by discharging the
(traditionallydefined)duties of one's station, rather than by autonomously
creatingor unfoldinga unique individual
existence.In traditionalsociety, thereare
neither human beings, in the relevant
moral sense, nor equal, inalienable,and
universalrights.
Many traditionalsocietieswere slave or
caste societies;few were subjectto democraticcontrolin even a very loose senseof
that term. Individual deviations from
communal norms usually were harshly
repressed, and women and outsiders
usually were treated as inferior beings.
Nonetheless,in theory at least, and often
in practiceas well, a certainsort of dig-
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nity, tied to the proper fulfillment of
social roles, could be achieved by most
people. Furthermore,social responsibilities usually were coupled with reciprocal
social and economicprotections.In traditional societiesmost peoplehad a defined,
secure, and (within its own terms)dignified place in society.
Therefore,one can at least understand,
and perhaps even contextually justify,
traditional society's denial of human
rights. One might even argue that the
traditionalconceptionof humandignityis
superiorto that of liberalism.For example, it might be argued that most people
preferregulated,securesocial roles, with
their concomitantsense of belonging, to
autonomy and its attendantinsecurities.
Insider"individuals"may well have fared
betterin many ways as part of traditional
society than as, say, a textile worker in
mid-nineteenthcenturyEnglandor South
Koreatoday.
Such arguments, however, are not
humanrightsarguments.To defendtraditional society is to reject a society based
on equal, inalienable,universalpersonal
rights in favor of a status-basedsociety.
To prefertraditionalsociety to liberalism
is to reject a society of equal and
autonomous individualswith inalienable
personal rights in favor of a society of
unequal, regulated occupants of social
roles, incorporatedinto the community.
Traditionalsociety and humanrightscannot be combinedwithoutviolence to both
(cf. Donnelly, 1982a and Howard, 1986,
ch. 2).

ist traditionis an issue that cannot, and
certainly need not, be addressed here.
Our concerninsteadis with the frequently
encountered argument that communist
regimesare entirelyconsistentwith international human rights norms.
While thereare strikingsimilaritiesbetween traditional and communist societies, especiallyin the submergenceof the
individualto the community(state)and in
the use of social (class)roles to define individual worth, there are no less striking
differences.Traditionalsocieties have at
most a rudimentary state apparatus,
whereasin communistsocietiesthe state is
the central social institution, despite
ideologically obligatory referencesto its
withering away. Rather than the often
more or less face-to-facerelationsof small
traditional society, communist societies
range in size from millions to over a
billion people. Insteadof a relativelysimple divisionof labor, they have a complex
industrial division of labor, and rather
than an ethnically homogeneous community, often bound togetherby real or
mythic kinship ties, most communist
countriesare multi-ethnic.
This alters the entire texture of social
relations. The communist state simply
cannot be the functionalequivalentof the
traditionalcommunity;it necessarilyappearsas a distant, separateinstitution,incapable of providing the social and psychological support of close-knit traditional communities.Therefore,beingsubsumed into the "community"is quite a
differentprocess in communistsocieties.
Whilein traditionalsociety the individCommunism
ual is never fully differentiatedfrom the
By communismwe mean an ideal type group, in communistsocietiesindividuals
regime modeled on the structureand of- have been thoroughlydifferentiated.The
ficial ideology of contemporary Soviet modern economy, with its complex divibloc countries. The key feature of such sion of labor and extensive rolesocieties is a communistparty-statecom- segmentation, necessarily produces
mittedto total, revolutionarytransforma- economically, and thus socially, distinct
tion of social and personallife. The con- individuals, and state bureaucraciesare
nection between such regimes and the structured to deal (only) with (anonywritingsof Marxor the "authentic"Marx- mous or interchangeable) individuals.
809
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The politicaltask for communistregimes,
therefore, is to reabsorb the individual
into the (state) society. The primacy of
the state/society thereforemust be politically created-as is underscoredby the
very project of revolutionary social
transformation.One must be madea part
of the communityin communistsocieties.
However, since the basic socioeconomic organization of life under communismcontinuesto reproduceedifferentiated individuals, the process of (re)incorporationmust be constantlyrepeated.
Undifferentiatedeconomic reincorporation is impossible, however, and
ideological reincorporation, no matter
how hegemonic, is insufficient. Direct
political coercion, therefore,is a feature
of communistcollectivism that generally
is absentfrom traditionalsociety (because
of the effectiveness of other means of
social control).
As the task of the state/party/proletariat is to transformall aspects of social
existence,privatelife is not merelysubject
to public regulation, but must be made
public, and regulatedby the state, if the
revolution is to succeed. Those who
follow a bourgeois or otherwise reactionaryroad are entitledto neitherrespect
nor concern;at best they are ignored,and
more often they are activelyrepressed.As
one East Germanscholar states, "thereis
no freedom for enemies of the people"
(Klenner,1984, p. 15), who are definedas
social outsiders. Such a belief readily
leads to the identificationand repression
of pariah social classes and, in extreme
cases, class-based "genocide" directed
against kulaks or similar class enemies
(Kuper,1981, pp. 99-100).
The ethnic homogeneity of traditional
society is replacedby class homogenization. "Class position," however, means
simply conformity to behavioral norms
specified by the state. Equality, rather
than a fundamentaland inviolable moral
fact, is reducedto mere social sameness.
In communistsocieties, one is equal not
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by birth or by nature,but only to the extent that one is essentially indistinguishable from one's fellow communist citizens, an embodiment of the new communist man. Communist societies thus
produce a distinctive sort of homogenized, de-individualizedperson.
Communist societies obviously must
violate a wide range of civil and political
rightsduringthe revolutionarytransition,
and necessarily,not merelyas a matterof
unfortunate excesses in practice. Even
after communismis achieved, the denial
of civil and political rights remains
necessaryto preservethe achievementsof
the revolution. The permanentdenial of
civil and politicalrightsis requiredby the
commitmentto build society accordingto
a particularsubstantivevision, for the exerciseof personalautonomyand civil and
political rights is almost certainto undermine that vision.
Furthermore,communist regimes, for
all their achievements in providing
economic and social goods and services,
are fundamentally incompatible with
economicand social rights. In communist
societies, the possessionand enjoymentof
all rights are contingenton the discharge
of social duties. Forexample,Article59 of
the Soviet Constitution(1977) states that
"the exerciseof rights and libertiesis inseparablefrom the performanceby citizens of their duties"(cf. Burlatsky,1982;
Egorov, 1979, p. 39). Thus, for example,
access to higher education and desirable
jobs is closely linked to political connections or behavior. Few rights of any sort
are securein such a regime,and no human
rights, in the strongsense of equal and inalienable entitlementsof all individuals,
can be recognized.
It is important to stress the difference
betweenhavinga humanrightand merely
enjoying the substance of a right; between, for example,havingfood and having a right to food, or speakingfreely and
enjoying a right to free speech. In communist (and other communitarian)socie-
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ties, one may be guaranteedthe substance
of certainhuman rights (Shue, 1980, pp.
75-76)-that is, goods, services, and opportunitiesmay be enjoyed.They arenot,
however, enjoyed as rights; those who
conform receive certain benefits, but the
state may freelybestow or withdrawthese
as it sees fit (cf. Donnelly, 1985, pp.
11-12, 52-53, 77-80). This is as true of
economic and social rights as civil and
political rights. One is not entitled to
these benefits simply as a human being,
one does not have the specialcontrolprovided by possession of a right, and one's
claims to enjoy thesebenefitsdo not have
the force of human rights.
In communistregimes,in fact, even as a
citizen one is entitledto nothing from the
state: "Human rights . . . do not exist
outside the state or against the state. The
state is theircreator"(Lopatka,1979, p. 7;
cf. Weichelt, 1979, p. 3). Rights are acquired only by the discharge of class
obligations, as defined by the state
(Lieberam,1979, p. 14). Social outsiders,
such as landowners or the bourgeoisie,
may lose not only their formerproperty
rights, but also all other rights.
Communist society thus rests on a
social utilitarianism fundamentally incompatiblewith humanrights. The good
of society, as determinedby the state/
party, always takes precedenceover all
else. Because individual "rights" must
always yield to social purposes, as enunciated by the state, such "rights"are
worthless;no matterwhat the state does,
it cannot be held guilty of violating them.
Whatever the benefits and opportunities
citizens may (contingently)receive-and
they are undeniably substantialin some
communist regimes-communism represents a thoroughdenial of human rights.
Corporatism
Corporatism,a principalform of contemporary right-wing regimes, can be
defined as
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a system of interest representation in which the
constituent units are organized into a limited
number of single, compulsory, non-competitive,
hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not
created) by the state and granted a deliberate
representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain
controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and support. (Schmitter, 1974,
pp. 93-94)

Corporatistregimespresentthemselves
as neutral instruments to regulate and
mediate the antitheticalinterestsof labor
and capital, with other groups-such as
women and youth-often officially organized and incorporated into the political structure as well, further undercuttingbasic structuralconflicts. In practice, however, classruleis unambiguously
at the heart of corporatism.The essential
purposeof its ideology and politicalstructureis to preventfurtherclass conflictand
entrenchthe extant economic hierarchy.
The state proclaimsthe equal dignityof
all segmentsof society. Meanwhile, unequal privatepower and propertyaccumulate. Workersand peasantsare not necessarily excluded from a share of social
benefits-for example, state controlled
trade unions may be allowed to pursue
certain improvementsin working conditions or living standards,so long as class
conflicts are denied-but they benefit
only inadvertentlyor as a side-payment
to co-opt potential opponents of the ruling corporate coalition. Equal concern
and respectis at best ignored.
One variantof corporatism,which can
be called authoritarianismfor want of a
better term, preserves an important
sphereof private autonomy and activity.
Religionand education,for example,may
be left as a private matter. This privacy,
however, is only a realm of public indifference. It is quite differentfrom positive
respect for or protection of a right to
privacy and related human rights. Privacy (of thought,religion,belief)is not so
much protected in authoritarianregimes
as it is ignored-and it is ignoredonly as
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long as it does not interfere with the basic
corporatist bargain. Personal autonomy
is, at best, not a right but a contingent
benefit.
The fascist variant of corporatism,
however, is actively hostile to the private.
In reaction to what it views as the unabated individualism of liberal society,
fascism proclaims a romantic ideology of
(mythic) consensus, homogeneity, and
personal comfort in conforming to social
roles. Human dignity is to be achieved
into an allthrough integration
encompassing moral order, represented
by the fascist state. Much as in communism, any challenge to this order, including deviation in personal values and
beliefs, is treated as a threat to the entire
social fabric.
This ideology of the primacy of the
state readily leads to terror and scapegoating. Nonviolent denials of civil and
political right are likely to be inadequate
to prevent independent "political" activity, now redefined to include much of
"private" personal life. Direct terror is
likely to be necessary; so also is the creation and persecution of outsider or scapegoat groups, in extreme cases culminating
in genocide. Such persecution not only
allows the state to displace real social tensions arising from the corporatist
character of society, but, in the very
denial of the rights of the scapegoat
group, reaffirms the unity of the fascist individual, society, and state.
From a human rights perspective,
however, fascism is merely the extreme
form of corporatism; fascism may actively violate more rights, but authoritarian corporatism is unlikely to protect
many more. One cannot even assuredly
say that life is preferable for the average
individual in authoritarian corporatism;
for example, if public indifference results
in anomie, the intense feeling of belonging
espoused by fascism may seem preferable,
at least for insiders. In any case, authoritarian corporatism's public indifference to
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the bulk of society is certainlya denial of
equal concern, while its denial of independent political action is incompatible
with equal respect. Whatever the form,
corporatismdenies inherentpersonaldignity and equal concernand respectin the
very bargainthat defines the regime.
DevelopmentDictatorship
One further type of communitarian
regime,which we call developmentdictatorship, should be briefly noted. In
development dictatorships,the principal
resourceof the rulingelite is controlof the
meansof coercion,justifiedin the nameof
the most rapid possible economic development. Development, which has
achieved an unprecedented ideological
hegemony in the Third World, is easily
presentedas the moral equivalentof war,
requiring the subordination of the individual to the state. Therefore, in the
hands of repressiveelites it nicely justifies
a wide range of human rights violations,
especially since the connection between
particular violations and underlying
developmentgoals is likely to be at best
very loosely defined.
Development dictatorship is distinguishedfrom corporatismor communism
in large measureby its class structure.In
development dictatorships, economic
class position is less the source of power
than the result of control of the state. In
nationalized economies, the organizational (Markovitz,1977, ch. 6) or bureaucratic(Shivji,1976, pt. 3) "bourgeoisie"is
composed of occupants of high-level office in the military, the government, the
bureaucracy, or the ruling party. A
parasitic private bourgeoisie, essentially
living off its economic relationswith the
state, may also exist. Controlled by
membersof thesevariouselites, who have
few resources other than coercion to
maintaintheirpower, developmentdictatorshipsfrequentlydegeneratein cycles of
coups and countercoups,or, once stabil-
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ized, evolve into some sort of corporatist
regime.The regimerests lightly on top of
society, rather than being a political
representationof deep underlyingsocioeconomicforces (cf. Hyden, 1983, ch. 2).
Evenwherethe regime'scommitmentto
development is genuine, rather than
merely a cover for elite depredations-so
that there is an attempt to provide the
substance of some economic and social
rights-enshrining development as an
overridingsocial objectiveassuresthat individualsand theirrightswill regularlybe
ignored. The value put on privacy tends
to be low, as privategoals might interfere
with national development goals. The
identification of "outsiders," economic
saboteurs,or similarscapegoatgroupsis a
common diversionarytactic when developmentplans fail. Fullpersonaldignity is
conceived largely as an abstract future
good, to be realizedonly after success in
the strugglefor development.In general,
individualhumanrights, especiallyrights
against the state, the essential agent of
development, must wait until development has been achieved. Once more, we
are faced with a choice between human
rights and alternativesocial goals based
on a radically different conception of
human dignity.

ian societies the state (or traditional
authorities),as the representativeof society, must control family life, religion,
education, and all other potentiallyindependent aspects of life. Any institution
that might influence or challenge the
reigningregime and its ideology must be
eradicated, or at least regulated; often
one'svery beliefs,and certainlyall aspects
of one'sbehavior,are treatedas legitimate
mattersfor social regulation.
When personal autonomy is thus
denied-even repressedas a threatto society-moral equalitymust also be denied;
some people-those who "fit in"-are
treated as more worthy of concern or
respectthan others. The full range of internationalhumanrightsmust therebybe
violated.
The ruleof law and proceduraldue process are obviously incompatiblewith such
regimes; pursuit of the community's
substantive goals overrides "mere procedures." Due process is also rejected
because it suggests that political organs
representative of the full community
might treatcitizensunfairly, a possibility
denied by the communitarianpremiseof
the regime. Equalprotectionof the laws,
and nondiscrimination more broadly,
also are incompatiblewith communitarian regimes. In fact, positive discriminaCommunitarianism
and the Impossibility tion againstsocial deviants is essentialto
the political pursuit of unity; differences
of HumanRights
betweenindividualsor groups(otherthan
Whethercommunitarianismis forward those that are officially sanctioned) are
or backward looking, it is structurally, not to be protected-let alone valued as
ideologically, and philosophicallyincom- expressionsof autonomy-but ratherrepatible with human rights. The view of
pressed, or at best ignored. In communihuman dignity found in all communitar- tarianregimes,one is entitledto the proian societiesis that the individualrealizes tectionof the laws and a guaranteedshare
himself as part of the group by unques- of social resourcesand opportunitiesonly
tioningly filling his social role or being to the extent that one fits within certain
loyal to the state. This conception of
substantive, ideologically defined
human dignity is incompatible with categories.
human rights.
Political participation is similarly
At the core of this incompatibilityis the restricted, both in its substance and its
denial of social value to personal participants. Debate over fundamental
autonomy and privacy. In communitar- social and political aims cannot be al813
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Table 1. Social Conceptionsof HumanDignity:A Typology
RegimeType

Autonomyvs.
Conflictvs.
Role Fulfillment Consensus

Liberal
Autonomy
Minimal
Autonomy
Traditional
Roles
Communist
Roles
Corporatist
Roles
Developmental Roles

Conflict
Conflict
Consensus
Consensus
Consensus
Consensus

lowed, because they are already set by
tradition or the reigning ideology. Likewise, politics is dominated by a small
elite, chosen by ascription, restricted
party membership, or other nondemocratic means-or, where the forms of
democraticpoliticsare utilized(e.g., communism),real controllies elsewhere(e.g.,
a vanguardparty).
Many communitarian societies,
however, do perform relatively well in
providing the substance of economic
rights. Many espouse, and some do
achieve, relative equality of materialcircumstancesand a basic floor of material
security. But such economic "rights"are
mere benefits, contingent on approved
membershipin the political community
and on the performanceof social duties.
Citizens are not entitled to these goods
and services; at most they may petition
for them, not claim them as rights.
Material security certainly is valuable,
whether it is a right or a privilege, but
such "security"is precariouslyinsecurein
the absence of human rights held against
the state, since it can be taken away as
easily as it is granted.
In sum, communitarian regimes fall
short of the standardof human rights in
all major areas. Much as liberalism is
necessarilycommitted to protecting, implementing, and fostering the enjoyment
of the full range of internationally
recognizedhuman rights, communitarian
regimesnecessarilyviolate the full range
of human rights.
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Repression
of Outsiders

Valuation
of Privacy

Equalityvs.
Hierarchy

No
No (7)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes (7)

High
Very high
Very low
Very low
Low
Low

Equality
Hierarchy
Hierarchy
Equality
Hierarchy
Equality

Human Dignity, Human Rights,
and Political Regimes
We can pull togetherthis discussionin a
typology of social conceptionsof human
dignity. Table 1 lists the positions of our
six types of regimeson five sociopolitical
variables shown in the discussion above
to be importantto the social definitionof
humandignity. It is immediatelyapparent
from the first four columns that these
regimes fall into two broad classes, individualistic(liberaland minimal)regimes
and communitarian (traditional, communist, corporatist, and developmental)
regimes.
Not surprisingly,the firstfour variables
are rather closely related. Society's attitudetowardsautonomyis especiallyimportant. A commitment to personal
autonomy requires accepting a certain
degreeof social conflict, largelyprecludes
enforcingthe substantivemodels of belief
and behavior that are the basis for the
repressionof outsiders,and leaves open a
considerablerealm of valued private activity. Likewise, a stress on role fulfillment implies a consensual society: roles
are defined so as to produce consensus
when properly performed; "outsiders"
(those without approvedor valued roles)
are repressed;and privacy, which exists
outside of redefined roles, is not socially
valued.
There are, however, no less important
differences within each of these two
classes of regimes. Liberalism'scommit-
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Table 2. Social Conceptionsof HumanDignity and HumanRights Performance
Regime Type

Equality or
Hierarchy

Valuation of
Belonging

Civil and
Political Rights

Economic and
Social Rights

Individualistic Regimes
Liberal
Minimal

Equality
Hierarchy

Moderate
Very low

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

Communitarian Regimes
Traditional
Communist
Corporatist
Developmental

Hierarchy
Equality
Hierarchy
Equality

Very high
High
Varies
Moderate (7)

No
No
No
No

Substance only
Substance only
No (7)
Substance (7)

ment to autonomy is matchedby a commitment to equality; human dignity, for
the liberal, requiresthe union of autonomy and equality. This commitmentto
equality furtherstrengthensthe tendency
not to repressoutsiders,or even to define
outsider groups other than noncitizens,
who are ignoredratherthan repressed.
In contrast, those at the bottom of the
minimalstate'ssocialhierarchyare denied
economicand social rights, as a result of
the absenceof a commitmentto equality
and the presence of an extremely high
valuation of privacy (especially private
economic activity) under minimalism.
Thus, they may be seen as indirectlyoppressed economic outsiders, and if the
lower classes attempt to challenge this
denial of economic and social rights,
direct repressionis likely. Furthermore,
whereas liberalismmerely accepts a certain amount of social conflict as an
unavoidable consequence of personal
autonomy, and even tempersconflict by
the pursuitof social and economicequality, minimaliststend to view social conflict in no worse than neutral terms, and
even as desirable competition between
unequal, atomistic individuals.
There are also important differences
among communitarianregimes. For example, there are considerabledifferences
in the substantive bases used for the
definitionof social membershipand roles.
The most importantdifferences,though,

concern the valuation of equality and
belonging(the obverseof privacy), as we
can see in Table 2, which correlatesthe
major determinantsof social conceptions
of human dignity with the human rights
performanceof each type of regime.
All communitarianregimesreject civil
and political rights, which can be recognized only when individualautonomy is
valued over role fulfillment. However,
traditional and communist regimes, one
hierarchical,the otheregalitarian,do provide the substance of (at least some)
economic and social rights (for insiders);
that is, they provide goods, services, and
opportunities,but without the power.or
control that comes with enjoying these
benefits as rights. The value placed on
equalitythen largelydeterminesthe range
and distributionof these benefits. Communist regimes are committed to providing themequally,and in greatand ever
increasing quantity. Hierarchical traditionalregimes,however, guaranteeonly a
minimumfloor for all (or at least all but
chattel slaves, untouchables,and similar
near-outsidergroups).
Corporatist and developmental
regimes-again, one hierarchical, the
other egalitarian-do not generallyoffer
even this much. The typical (authoritarian) corporatist regime protects only
the interests of the ruling coalition
(althoughfascist corporatismis likely to
provideat least some economicand social
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benefits to all insiders-thus the questionable "no"in Table 2). Developmental
regimes are ideologically committed to
providingthe substanceof economic and
social rights for all (insiders), at least in
the long run, but since the social composition of such regimes usually belies and
precludesthe realizationof this commitment, it remains of at best questionable
practicalsignificance.
This suggeststhat at least as important
a variable as equality or hierarchyis the
valuation of belonging. Traditional and
communist regimes highly value belonging, and thus provide the substance of
many social and economicrightsto all insiders, while corporatist and developmental regimes, which do not guarantee
even the substanceof economicand social
rights, place lower value on a sense of
belonging.This conclusionis also implied
by the comparisonof liberaland minimal
regimes. The absence of economic and
social rights in minimal regimes is explained not simply by the absence of a
social commitmentto equality, but also
by the very low valuation of belonging.
Only when autonomy, equality, and at
least a moderatelyhigh value on belonging are combined-as in liberalism-do
we find a commitmentto economic and
social rights,and not just theirsubstance.
Only with a commitment to personal
autonomy will a regime actively protect
civil and political rights. In other words,
only in a liberalregimecan therebe a fundamentalpoliticalcommitmentto the full
range of internationally recognized
human rights.
Other social systemsmay claim to have
competing views of human rights. They
do not. Rather, they rest on competing
views of humandignity, all of which deny
both the centrality of the individual in
politicalsociety and the (human)rightsof
men and women to make, and have enforced, equal and inalienable civil,
political, economic, and social claims on
the state. Only liberalism,understoodas
816

a regime based on the political right to
equal concern and respect, is a political
system based on humanrights.
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